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Against the background of possible substantial sea-level rise, an important question is, to what
extent are coastal societies able to adapt? This question is often answered in the negative by
referring to sinking islands and submerged mega-cities. While these risks are real, the picture is
incomplete  because  it  lacks  consideration  of  adaptation.  This  Perspective  explores  societies’
abilities  to  adapt  to  21st  century  sea-level  rise  by  integrating  perspectives  from  coastal
engineering, economics, finance and social sciences, and provides a comparative analysis of a set
of cases that vary in technological limits, and economic, financing, and social conflict barriers to
coastal adaptation. 
Recent literature has reinforced concerns about possible substantial sea-level rise (SLR) due to rapid
melting  of  ice  sheets1 which  may  lead  to  21st  century  global  mean  SLR  of  2  m  or  more.2–4
Discomfortingly,  the  potential  for  high-end  SLR  may  remain  even  if  the  ambition  of  the  Paris
Agreement to limit the temperature increase well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels is met. This is
due to the large uncertainties associated with ice-sheet responses and sea levels continuing to rise for
thousands of years even if greenhousegas concentration will be stabilized during the 21st century.5,6 
Against  this  background,  an  important  question is  to  what  extent  societies  are  able  to  adapt  and
maintain human settlements safe from SLR and associated extremes during the 21st century. Following
the current sea-level rise literature and the media, this question is often seemingly answered in the
negative by referring to, for example, the “complete flooding and submergence of entire mega-cities.”5
or showing emblematic cities around the world submerged by the sea.7 While these headlines illustrate
that  SLR may constitute a major  challenge to  coastal  societies,  they are incomplete and possibly
misleading in that they neglect coastal adaptation. This is specifically true because adaptation could
reduce some coastal impacts by several orders of magnitude.8,9 Furthermore, coastal societies have a
long history of adapting to environmental change and local SLR because coasts are amongst the most
dynamic environments on Earth.10 For example, a number of coastal mega-cities in river deltas have
experienced, and adapted to, relative SLR of several meters caused by land subsidence during the 20 th
century.11 
Efforts that integrate across biophysical and social dimensions of SLR impacts and adaptation are
limited in the otherwise vast literature on SLR. This perspective provides such an effort and addresses
the question of societies' abilities to adapt to 21st century SLR by analysing a set of diverse cases from
around the world in terms of four main factors that have been empirically found to constrain societies'
abilities to adapt (Fig. 1). These factors are defined in Box 1. We assess technical limits and economic
barriers  under  21st  century  SLR and  socio-economic  development,  assuming  current  technology.
Following  the  empirical  social  science  literature  on  adaptation  barriers,12–14 we  assess  financing
barriers and social conflict barriers mainly for the present situation with limited speculation on how
these barriers may evolve during the century.
Figure 1: Coastal adaptation constraints.  Coastal adaptation is situated within interacting natural
and social sub-systems and my be constrained by technological limits, and economic, financing, and
social conflict barriers. Adapted from Nicholls et  al.15
The purpose of this effort is not to analyse which criteria are actually used in decision making nor to
prescribe how decisions should be made. For example, the presence of an economic barrier does not
mean that coastal societies actually decide using social benefit-cost analysis, nor that societies should
not adapt, because there are many other reasons for adaptation beyond monetary ones, such as human
safety or nature conservation.  Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to study how different factors
combine in a given case, so that further research and policy attention can be aimed at those factors that
are critical in the given case. The combination of constraints found has thereby indications on possible
pathways for overcoming these.  For example,  the presence of both finance and economic barriers
suggest that future efforts should focus on grant finance, while if only financing barriers are present,
concessional and private finance may also be sought.16 
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The cases have been chosen to cover different coastal landforms, income groups, types of coastal
impacts, as well as urban and rural settings (Table 1). While the cases we consider here are coastal, the
framework is generic and can be applied for integrated analysis in other fields of adaptation.
 
Box 1: Adaptation limits and barriers
A growing literature has categorized factors that have been observed to constrain adaptation. This
literature  distinguishes  between  limits  beyond  which  human  activities  cannot  be  maintained  and
barriers which can be overcome through adequate efforts, technology, deployment of economic and
human resources, management and institutional change.14,17–19 For social constraints it is preferable to
use the term barrier rather than limit, because what may be considered a social limit is mutable and
depends on cultural  context  and human values.12 Here,  we consider  the following four adaptation
constraints, because they i) have been found to be most relevant in previous empirical analysis; 13,20,21
and ii) represent the perspectives of the main groups of actors involved in coastal adaptation.
Technological limits arise when there are no adaptation options available to effectively reduce the
impacts of SLR, including the consideration of the time needed for implementing options. Asserting
technical limits requires the subjective choice of an adaptation goal.12 Here we consider the goal of
maintaining  human  settlements  safe  from  SLR  and  associated  extremes  through  protection  and
accommodation  measures  as  this  perspective  has  been  prominently  represented  in  societies  for
centuries by coastal engineering.10 We deliberatively exclude the coastal adaptation measure of retreat,
because it is, in principle, always possible and hence never technologically limited. Asserting technical
limits also entails the choice of a level of acceptable risks (or probability or consequence) as any
coastal protection or accommodation measure may fail and there is no absolute or objective measure
of effectiveness or safety.17
Economic barriers arise  if  the  implementation and maintenance of  adaptation are  more costly  in
monetary terms than the impacts they avoid, as assessed through social benefit-cost analysis (BCA).
BCA comes along with several well-known limitations that have been widely discussed in the climate
change literature. First, not all costs and benefits can be adequately monetized. 22 Second, results are
very sensitive to the choice of the discount rate applied.22–24 Third, costs and benefits are aggregated
across  actors,  which  means  that  socially  preferred  options  may  differ  from  those  preferred  by
individual actor.25,26 To capture this issue specifically relevant to adaptation, we include the barrier of
social  conflicts  as  described  below.  Nevertheless,  BCA  constitutes  a  prominent  public  decision
making perspective on coastal adaptation and is legally prescribed in countries such as the US, the UK
and The Netherlands.
Financing barriers arise if it is difficult to access financial resources for adaptation, including from
public budgets,  development and climate finance and private sources.18 This perspective has been
included, because it is central to the adaption finance activities under the United Nations Framework
Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC),  as  well  as  to  donor  and  development  finance
organisations and public authorities involved in funding adaptation. 
Social conflict barriers arise  whenever  stakeholders'  conflicting  interests  impede  or  exacerbate
adaptation. In the social sciences, the concept of social conflict is a fundamental one for understanding
why  or  why  not  societies  manage  to  act  collectively  in  that  they  develop  informal  and  formal
institutions such as culture, laws, policies, social norms and conventions that guide human behaviour
to resolve social conflicts.27–31 Social conflicts may arise due to diverging private interests (e.g.,  a
Catalan  tourist  operator  favouring  beach  nourishment  and  an  environmental  activist  opposing),
diverging  public  interests  at  different  levels  of  administration  (e.g.,  conflicting  building  codes  at
Federal, State and City levels in New York; also called institutional crowdedness barrier 13) or between
actors' interests and existing institutions (e.g., populations of remote islands opposing a population
centralisation  policy  in  the  Maldives;  also  called  cultural  constraints,12,18 or  political  (economy)
barriers20,25).  Here,  we  apply  the  broad  concept  of  social  conflict,  because  this  represents  the
perspectives  of  diverse  stakeholders  involved  and  constitutes  the  first  step  in  any  analysis  of
governance issues. From there, analysis can proceed to exploring more specific questions regarding
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the nature of the social conflict and how this may be overcome.14,30
Case Dominant coastal characteristics Adaptation constraints
Coastal 
landform
World Bank 
country income 
group 2017
Human 
settlements
Mean 
population 
density 
(people/km²)*
Technol
ogical 
limits
Economi
c 
barriers
Financi
ng 
barriers
Social 
conflict 
barriers
Bangladesh Delta Lower middle 
income
Rural *1,100 X X
Catalonia Beaches, 
deltas, cliffs
High income Rural/urban *900 X
Ho Chi Minh
City
Delta Lower middle 
income
Urban *3,900 Some X X
Maldives Atoll islands Higher middle 
income
Urban **63,000
X
Rural *1,500 X X
New York 
City
Estuary High income Urban *11,000 X X
Netherlands Delta, 
beaches
High income Rural/urban *500 X
Table 1: Coastal adaptation cases considered in this paper, their coastal and social characteristics,
and adaptation constraints found in maintaining human settlements safe from 21st century sea-
level  rise. *  Mean  population  density  values  are  based  on  the  UN-adjusted  GPWv4  year  2010
population density dataset.32 For the administrative boundaries of the case studies we used the Global
Administrative Areas (GADM) dataset version 2.0 (http://www.gadm.org/). For New York City, Ho
Chi Minh City and the Maldives mean population density was calculated for the entire administrative
area  of  the  city.  For  Catalonia,  Bangladesh  and  the  Netherlands  mean  population  density  was
calculated for the LECZ (low elevation coastal zone; areas ≤ 10m and hydrologically connected to the
ocean).  For  Bangladesh,  the  districts  of  Cox’s  Basar,  Bandarban,  Chittagong,  Ramgamati  and
Khagrachhari were excluded as they are outside the delta. For the definition of the LECZ we used
CGIAR-CSI SRTM v4.1 elevation data.33 ** Population density for the capital island of Malé taken
from http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/maldives-population/.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh,  largely  situated  on  the  delta  of  the  Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna  rivers,  is  widely
recognised as one of the most hazardous large countries on Earth, having rural population densities
exceeding 1,000 people/km2, and being impacted by river and sea floods, salinization and drought,
exacerbated  by  climate  change,  SLR  and  land  subsidence.34,35 There  are  extensive  diked  polder
systems which protect agriculture, against most flooding (Fig. 2), but failures during more extreme
tropical  storms are common, causing agricultural  damage.  Upgrade of these dikes is  ongoing and
higher  reliability  can be expected in  the  future.  Experiments  are  also in  progress  with controlled
sedimentation to raise land levels, termed tidal river management.36,37 All of these measures are part of
Bangladesh  Delta  Plan  2100,38 a  holistic,  integrated  and  long-term  plan  that  the  government  is
currently developing, learning from the Dutch Delta Programme experience.
Technological  limits. From  a  technological  point  of  view,  high-end  SLR  would  be  extremely
challenging, but the technological measures that are needed either exist or are being developed. For
example,  in  rural  areas,  tidal  river  management  combined  with  of  order  109 tonnes  of  sediment
delivered by the rivers per year offers great potential to build land elevation with sea level. 39 Changes
in land use such as from agriculture to aquaculture are also feasible and already occurring. Urban areas
would need to be protected with more conventional methods. Rising salinity is a challenge which
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might be countered by a range of measures such as salt tolerant crops and freshwater reservoirs. While
these  options  are  available  much  more  assessment  and  trials  of  their  application  are  required,
recognising that this may be made more challenging due to other barriers mentioned below.40
Economic barriers. With a dense rural and urban population, adaptation provides large direct and
indirect monetary benefits, such as avoided damages and reduced health effects of flood events. All
the options mentioned above are expected to have benefits exceeding their costs, although it is hard to
find detailed analyses demonstrating this. 
Financing barriers. Bangladesh is the biggest recipient of climate adaptation funds, and is also a
major recipeint of donor aid, receiving $2.6 billion in 2013.41 Many NGOs such as the Red Cross Red
Crescent are active, such as in the provision of cyclone shelters. Significant efforts have been funded,
but  future  funding  needs  are  large38 and  the  maintenance  of  existing  polder  systems  is  often
constrained by a lack of funds.42
Social conflicts. Bangladesh’s dense population and intense land use means it is easy for conflict to
emerge. For example, conversion of agriculture to aquaculture has given rise to conflicts associated to
land grabbing, salinization impacts and reduced labour demand.43 Tidal river management removes
large areas of land from use while the land is being flooded and raised, which affects households
income.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  profound  change  with  major  rural  to  urban  migration  and
agriculture progressively diminishing relative to the national economy, so adaptation is occurring on
an evolving stage.44
Figure 2: Polder system in coastal Bangladesh south of Khulia. Polders are low-lying tracts of land
enclosed by dikes, which are widespread in densely populated deltas with the main goal of promoting
agriculture. The polder dikes and drains will require substantial upgrade to remain effective under
rising sea levels. Courtesy Robert Nicholls.
Catalonia
The 600 km long Catalan coastal zone in the Spanish Mediterranean concentrates about 62% of the
population and about 65 % of the GDP of Catalonia, with tourism being the main economic activity
(>10% of GDP).45 The major SLR-induced impacts are related to  enhanced shoreline erosion due to
the combination of narrow beaches and lack of accommodation space. 46 The SLR impacts of coastal
flooding and  inundation are low due to the steep coastal  topography,  with the exception of some
lowlands.47,48 Currently, adaptation measures are oriented towards maintaining beaches for recreation
and enhancing protection of the hinterland through artificial nourishment (i.e., counteracting shoreline
erosion by replacing the eroded sand).
Technological  limits. There  are  no  technological  limits  for  these  adaptation  measures.  Some
challenges relate to the availability of adequate sand volumes for nourishment,49 because the sand used
for nourishment needs to have a grain size compatible (i.e., similar or coarser) with the eroded sand or
nourishment needs to be combined with additional measures to reduce sediment mobility. In the past,
nourishment has not always been effective because it was carried out mainly reactively when major
erosion impacts were already observed.
Economic  barriers. Generally,  beach  nourishment  is  highly  beneficial  in  areas  of  tourism
development due to the large contribution of coastal tourism to Catalan GDP.50 Empirical studies have
found that beaches in front of hotels raise prices of hotel rooms by up to 17%  along the Catalan
coast.51 Unit costs for sand are, however, expected to rise in the future, because the shallow near-shore
sites from which most of the sand is gained today are expected to be exhausted, which will increase
the distance between sand source sites and nourishment sites.
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Financing  barriers.  Currently, there  are  no  financing  barriers  as  beach  nourishment  is  publicly
financed by the Spanish Government. The required annual nourishment costs will, however, increase
with SLR and it is not clear how long public finance can be maintained in the future.
Social  conflicts. Increasing  social  activism is  questioning  the long-term sustainability  of  a  beach
nourishment strategy due to its potential negative ecological impacts on high-value coastal ecosystems
such as endemic Posidonia sea-grass meadows.52 In addition, the multi-level governance structure for
coastal  zone management generates conflicts  between national,  regional  and local  administrations,
limiting the implementation of effective adaptation policy.53 The Spanish Central Government takes
beach nourishment decisions within the so-called Maritime-Terrestrial Public Domain, the Regional
Government is responsible for land use planning outside this domain, and the local municipalities are
responsible for urban planning adjacent to this domain.54,55 For example, in 2016 a group of coastal
municipalities  northwards  of  Barcelona  opposed  obtaining  sediment  for  beach  nourishment  by
nearshore dredging claiming that this would promote unsustainable coastal management.
Ho Chi Minh City
As a  fast-growing delta  metropolis,  Ho Chi  Minh City,  Vietnam,  is  heavily affected by  frequent
flooding today, a phenomenon that will exacerbate with SLR, changes in precipitation extremes and
present rates of land subsidence of about 1 cm/year.56 A combination of adaptation measures could be
implemented to substantially reduce flood risk, including i) building a system of ring dikes around the
urban area,57 ii)  elevating  districts  where  people  and assets  most  concentrate,  and  iii)  retrofitting
buildings to reduce damage in households and small businesses. So far, only limited private adaptation
has been carried out in the form of retrofitting existing houses and elevating land for new houses (Fig.
3).
Technological limits. Considering all measures together, there are no apparent technological limits to
coastal adaptation. Elevating districts should effectively reduce flood risks even under high-end SLR.
As SLR progresses, all of these measures will need to be combined and substantially upgraded over
time.58
Economic barriers.  Investing into most of the aforementioned measures promises high benefit-cost
ratios.59 Using a discount rate of 5%, for example, elevating areas at high risk and retrofitting buildings
would have 21st century benefit-cost ratios of 8-11 and 15, respectively, and net present values of US$
33-48 billion and US$ 69-73 billion, respectively, assuming a SLR between 50 and 180 cm. Under the
same assumptions, a ring dike would have benefit-cost-ratios of 1.2 for 50 cm SLR, but negative for
180 cm SLR.
Financing barriers. Adaptation faces deep financing challenges. So far, the city has not managed to
secure finance for the highly beneficial flood protection options, even in the face of vast damage and
nuisance during every monsoon season. A ring dike, for example, would require investments in the
order of US$ 1.4 to 2.6 billion.60
Social conflicts. One conflict that has been found to inhibit large scale investment is disagreement on
adaption measures between authorities at various administrative levels.57 For example, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development favours the ring dike, whereas the city government opposes it for
both environmental reasons and fear of protests.61 A ring dike would likely trigger conflict between
urban and rural populations, since rural citizens outside the ring dike will suffer even greater floods.
Building-scale measures would not lead to this particular conflict, but they would also not keep water
out of Ho Chi Minh’s streets, hampering the transformation of the city into the modern business hub
that it aspires to be.
Figure 3: Stilt houses on a river bank in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. This flood-mitigation measure
is widely applied by the poorest, most exposed and vulnerable share of the population and stands in
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stark contrast to the new high-rise residential apartments on the background. Courtesy Stijn Koole
(Bosch Slabbers Landscape + Urban Design).
The Maldives
The Maldives consist of 1,192 atoll islands with a mean elevation of approximately 1.5 m above mean
sea level. One third of the country's population of 400,000 lives in the urban capital island of Malé
(Fig.  4),  which  is  one  of  the  world’s  most  densely  populated  cities.62 To  relieve  this  population
pressure the Maldives have constructed a new island, Hulhumalé, on a reef-flat directly adjacent to
Malé and included adaptation by raising the island to just over 2 m above mean sea-level.63
Technological limits. Island expansion and construction by land claim is a mature and wide spread
technology,  common  in  the  Maldives  and  many  other  parts  of  the  world.  The  elevated  island
Hulhumalé will be safe from flooding until SLR reaches approximately 0.6 m and thereafter it could
suffer  from periodic flooding due to energetic  swell  waves.64 Island raising,  however,  can further
continue even under high-end SLR, and further adaptation such as dikes, early-warning systems and
shelters can supplement this. The highly permeable substrate of all Maldives islands should be noted
as a possible challenge.
Economic barriers. Island construction is, for densely populated atoll nations, at relatively low cost,
because the reef-flats that need to be filled with sand are shallow (1-2 m in the case of Hulhumalé),
which minimises sand requirements. The cost of reclaiming Hulhumalé were about US$ 30 per m².
While  no  detailed  benefit-cost  analysis  is  available,  adaptation  through  land reclamation  and fill
around Malé is deemed to have a high benefit-cost ratio even when raising islands by 2 m due the high
real-estate  prices  (about  US$  2,000  per  m²).  Contrary  to  this,  land  raising  is  not  economically
beneficial in areas of low population density, which includes most of the remote islands.  
Financing  barriers.  Island  construction  was  financed by  the  Government  of  the  Maldives  and a
concessional loan form the Saudi Fund for Development.65 Generally, land reclamation is attractive for
investors,  because  investments  can  be  paid  back  in  the  short  term  through  real-estate  revenues
generated on the newly created land.  In  addition,  the  Maldivian economy has  been attractive for
investors, because it has been growing at an average rate of 7.4% over the last 30 years.66
Social conflicts. The main social  conflict  regarding adaptation is a distributional  one between the
urban  elites  on  one  hand  and  the  peripheral  islands  on  the  other  hand.67 The  former  favour  a
centralisation of population and services on a few well-protected islands with the dual goal of reducing
costs of services (National Population Consolidation Policy) and of reducing coastal risk (Safer Island
Strategy). These policies, however, meet the opposition of inhabitants of smaller and more remote
islands as they are perceived to “destroy the country’s 3,000-year-old cultural identity and its social
fabric.”68
Figure 4: Malé, the capital island of The Maldives.  High and increasing population densities in
Malé have led to the reclamation of  the nearby island of  Hulhumalé,  which can bee seen in the
background of the photo. (c) Shahee Ilyas https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=621195
The Netherlands
While a large part of The Netherlands already lies below sea levels, and complex defences against sea
floods are in place, SLR entails a number of challenges including i) salt intrusion stressing agricultural
production and freshwater provision in the west;69 ii) the Maeslant barrier, protecting Rotterdam city
and harbour, ceasing to be effective under 50 cm SLR; and iii) the IJssel lake system not providing
necessary flood and drought relief with > 30 cm SLR;70,71. Furthermore, coastal flood impacts will be
compounded by increases in Rhine and Meuse river peak discharges.72 These challenges are currently
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being addressed in the context of the Delta Programme through a combination of measures including
sand nourishments, dunes, dyke improvements, river widening and urban planning and adaptation.
Technological  limits. The dominant  impression is  that  the  Netherlands can technically  cope with
future SLR of 0.9 m by 2100,71 or 1.5 m/century, although with “major improvements.”70 Research
also showed that with an investment of ~€80bn, it is possible to preserve territorial integrity of the
Netherlands even under 5m SLR, using current engineering technology.73,74
Economic barriers. For the Netherlands as a whole, coastal adaptation to 0.8m SLR was deemed
economically highly beneficial, with an overall benefit-cost ratio of 5 using a discount rate of 4%. 75
Adaptation cost are estimated to €1.6 to 3.1 billion per year up to 2050 (about 0.5% of the current
Dutch GDP), while the cost of doing nothing are much higher.76 BCA are not available for higher
SLR, but ballpark estimates suggest that under 5m of SLR, protection cost may exceed the cost of
evacuation.73 
Financing  barriers. The  Delta  Programme  2015  has  already  allocated  €1.2  billion  per  year  for
adaptation through the Delta Fund until 2028. State funding is assumed to be continued afterwards,
and it is foreseen that regional (the Water Boards) and local entities (municipalities) will supplement
these resources. Water Boards are autonomous governmental bodies that have their own independent
tax revenue system to maintain water infrastructure.
Social conflicts. The Netherlands has a long history of developing institutional arrangements (i.e., the
Water Boards) for dealing with saline-, fresh water and flooding conflicts and these are likely to be
effective in the future, at least under moderate levels of SLR.77 Current conflicts relate to areas where
dikes have been relocated in order to allow for larger peak flows. For some river widening projects, a
dozen of farms have either been rebuilt on elevated hills or have been relocated, which has triggered
huge debates.78 Under high-end SLR, large investments to protect the west of the country may spark a
debate over the distribution of resources with the population in the safe eastern parts, which already
feels neglected by the population in low lying cities in the west.79
New York City
Historical flood events have shown that hurricanes and winter storms can have considerable impacts
on New York City (NYC), as illustrated by Superstorm Sandy in 2012 causing more than US$ 20
billion of damage.80 SLR and population growth will further increase the potential consequences of
flooding. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, NYC has been formulating flood adaptation strategies,
which include a wealth of potential measures such as enhancing building codes, building dikes (“the
big U”),  installing large scale storm surge barriers,  and “green” engineering measures to enhance
resilience of wetlands against storm surges.81 
Technological  limits. Theoretically,  there  are  no  technological  limits  for  this  case.  The  main
technological challenge involved in implementing adaptation measures is that they have to fit into the
existing high-density building stock, which increases costs.82 Furthermore, a change of buildings codes
will effectively only pertain to new buildings.  
Economic barriers. The investment costs for different combinations of adaptation measures vary from
US$ 14.7-23.8 billion for strategies containing large scale levees, to US$ 11.6 billion for a “hybrid”
strategy  targeted  at  protecting  critical  infrastructure  and  enhancing  building  codes.83 When  only
considering the current climate conditions, benefit-cost ratios for all  combinations of measures are
below 1 (discount rate 4%). However, when also considering 21st century SLR of up to 1m, all benefit-
cost ratios are above 1, with the highest one being 2.5 for the hybrid strategy.
Financing barriers. After Sandy, the Federal Government made available US$16 billion for disaster
recovery and adaptation through the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act (2013), but the allocation of
this money is proceeding slowly.  To date,  US$ 4 billion have been allocated by NYC, mostly to
recovery.84 About US$ 1 billion has been spent on adaptation projects in NYC and New Jersey under
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the  Rebuild  by  Design  program.85 The  novel  aspect  of  this  program is  the  bottom-up process  to
develop projects as joint efforts between the public, research, private sector and government.
Social conflicts. One main distributional conflict in the context of coastal flood risk management in
the US relates to the National Flood Insurance Program subsidising flood insurance for home-owners
in  order  to  stimulate  them  to  enrol  into  the  program.  In  addition,  this  creates  disincentives  for
households  to  implement  disaster  risk reduction measures  such as  flood proofing their  homes.86,87
Another issue has been conflicting and fragmented policies issued by Federal, State and City level
authorities regarding building codes. The federal National Flood Insurance Program assigns building
codes to be implemented in 1-in-100 year flood zone, while State and City authorities have added
additional and conflicting requirements as to how much to elevate new buildings (called freeboard).87
State and city-level policies are under revision right now to address this issue.
Lessons learned across cases
Technological limits. In the cases considered a number of technological challenges such as the lack of
space for building protection infrastructure in densely populated cities are observed, but these do not
constitute technological limits but rather raise costs. While the cases chosen represent a wide variety
of contexts and SLR-related coastal challenges, this does not mean that generally no technological
limits  exist.  For  example,  coastal  protection  is  technologically  extremely  challenging  for  Miami,
because protected areas can be flooded from below due to the underlying porous limestone. Pumps can
be implemented to deal with the flooding issue, but this reduces groundwater storage and limits the
effects of infiltration pumps to reduce salinity intrusion into the aquifers.88
In principle, technological limits could also arise in the case of adaptation options not offering a low
enough level of residual risk for societies to accept (See Box 1). In our cases and beyond we currently
do not find evidence supporting this point and also expect that this will not be the case under 21 st
century SLR. Currently, at least 20 million people accept the risk of living up to several meters below
normal  high  tides  in  countries  such  as  Belgium,  Canada,  China,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the
Netherlands, Poland, Thailand, the UK, and the USA.89 In principle there is no technical obstacle to
engineer  coastal  protection  to  very  high  standards,  as  for  example  the  discussion  on  so-called
“unbreakable dikes” illustrates.90 Hence residual risks can be managed, but should never be forgotten
or taken for granted.
In  any  case,  it  seems  that  economic,  financing  and  social  conflict  barriers  are  reached  before
technological limits arise. The core questions concerning adaptation technology are how much this
will  cost,  whether societies will  be able to access sufficient  finance and resolve the distributional
conflicts associated with spending large amounts of public money on coastal protection rather than on
other policy domains. It should also be noted that coastal protection may lead to many unfavourable
side effects such as the loss of tourism due to a decline in beach attractiveness and the loss of coastal
ecosystem through coastal squeeze, which in turn may trigger social conflicts as elaborated further
below.
Economic barriers.  Few economic barriers are found in the six cases considered here. On the one
hand this is due to coastal adaptation research generally focusing on the hotspots of coastal social
impacts. In those low-lying areas with high population and asset densities it is generally economically
highly beneficial to protect against even high-end SLR. Hence, it is very unlikely that we will see
mega-cities submerged by SLR during the 21st century. On the other hand, the high benefit-cost ratios
found  here,  as  well  as  in  earlier  global  analyses,9 illustrate  why  massive  coastal  protection  is
widespread today and is likely to continue to be so during the 21st century, even if prices for sand and
other materials rise.
Conversely, protecting rural coastal areas and agricultural land will generally have benefit-cost ratios
below one, at least when only considering market values of benefits.  When also considering non-
market values, hard protection may actually lead to negative benefits, because it constrains coastal
wetlands such as mangroves and marshes to migrate inland with rising sea level. 91 A solution may be
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offered by so-called nature-based adaptation measures, which provide coastal protection together with
additional  ecosystem  service  benefits,  however  there  are  still  large  uncertainties  about  the
effectiveness of these solutions.92,93
Financing barriers.  Coastal adaptation seems to be frequently constrained by inaccessible finance,
even if benefit-cost ratios are high. One reason for this is that it is difficult to convert the benefits of
coastal adaptation into revenue streams for financing the up-front investment, because benefits, such
as the avoided damage of extreme sea-level events, occur stochastically over a long time horizon, and
are distributed across stakeholders. An interesting exception occurs when adaptation is combined with
the creation of short-term revenue streams via real-estate development on land either newly created or
made more valuable through coastal protection, as illustrated in the case of the Hulhumalé, Maldives;
as well as through urban land-reclamation projects in other parts of the world.94 
Social conflicts. Social conflicts are present in all the cases investigated here and very likely also
beyond these. Two types of conflicts were observed. The first one relates to actors that are negatively
affected  by  adaptation  measures.  In  Catalonia,  for  example,  the  tourism  sector  welcomes  beach
nourishment since it directly benefits, while those living from natural resources (e.g. fishermen) show
a growing opposition. This type of conflict can generally be expected in coastal adaptation, because
SLR and coastal  adaptation redistribute  risks  and benefits  amongst  stakeholders,  creating winners
favouring adaptation and losers objecting to it. The second type of conflict relates to the distribution of
public money between coastal actors receiving public support for adaptation and non-coastal actors
paying for this through taxes, as found in the cases of The Netherlands, NYC and Catalonia.
In  many  parts  of  the  world,  coastal  adaptation  is  further  complicated  by  existing  conflicts  over
resources. For example, illegal coastal sand mining is currently a major driver of coastal erosion in
many  parts  of  the  developing  world.95 In  Ghana,  for  example,  lack  of  law enforcement,  lack  of
employment opportunities for the youth, and high demand for sand from the construction industry
continue to make this practice attractive.96
Other social barriers. While the four types of limits and barriers considered here cover main societal
perspectives  on  coastal  adaptation,  they  are  not  exhaustive.  Even when no  conflict  of  interest  is
present, a lack of capacity of governance structures to plan, implement, enforce, monitor and maintain
coastal adaptation measures may constrain adaptation.18,97 In the Ho Chi Minh City case, for example,
the limited experience in dealing with large projects has been reported as a barrier to adaptation. 57 A
lack of capacity is particularly problematic when it comes to the  maintenance of coastal protection
infrastructure as this has caused many coastal disasters in the past such as in New Orleans, 98 just to
mention one prominent example. In other countries in which coastal defence systems have existed
over a long time, effective governance arrangements for maintenance, such as the Water Boards in the
Netherlands,  have  emerged.  Mixed  experiences  with  both  bottom-up  and  top-down  governance
structures have been gained in Bangladesh since the introduction of the Dutch-like polders in the
1960s.42 We have left this dimension aside, because it is difficult to make the concept of governance
capacity operational for a high-level comparison of diverse cases as done in this paper.99 
Evolution of limits and barriers. Adaptation constraints will evolve over time. Technological change
may help to overcome technological limits and economic barriers (i.e., by reducing adaptation unit
cost). The effect of this is likely to be small for classical “hard” coastal engineering measures as these
are mature technologies, but potentially larger for emerging nature-based solutions. For financing and
social conflict barriers it is more difficult to speculate how these will evolve during the 21st century.
On the one hand, economic growth and better institutions may help to overcome these barriers. On the
other hand, these barriers may aggravate as the overall expenditure for adaptation rises with sea-levels
and  this  will  have  to  compete  for  public  expenditure  with  other  needs,  such  as  pensions  and
unemployment. In any case, financing barriers are likely to persist in the near future, because in the
developed world austerity policy generally reduces public investment levels,100 and in the developing
world, where many countries rely on donor funding, the adaptation finance gap is large.101 
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Outlook and future research
Taken together, our results suggest bifurcating coastal futures during the 21st century. On the one hand,
urban and richer areas will continue to have engineered coasts with higher and higher defences, with
radically altered landscapes, and possible catastrophic consequences in the case of defence failure. On
the other  hand,  rural  and poorer  areas  will  struggle  to  maintain safe  human settlements  and will
eventually retreat  from the coast.  Such retreat is  likely to involve massive social conflict,  forcing
societies to address difficult questions concerning transfer payments, compensation and liability for
loss and damage.102 Looking beyond 2100, this picture may or may not change. As sea-levels will
continue to rise for millennia, the world is already committed to a long-term SLR in the range of 1.2 to
2.2 m under present levels of global warming, and this commitment could increase to 25-52m within
the next 10,000 years under cumulate emissions of 1280 and 5120 PgC.5 This means that our heirs
could either see a world similar to the one described in this paper or a radically different world with
sea levels tens of meters higher.  Irrespective of the deep uncertainties in future sea-levels,  strong
mitigation efforts can, and are needed to, reduce the risks of high-end sea-level rise.
In addition to mitigation efforts, research is needed to advance coastal adaptation by finding ways to
overcome prevailing barriers. Towards this end, we advance two avenues of research.  One avenue
concerns  research  and  experimentation  for  overcoming  technological  challenges  and  economic
barriers.  So-called green or  nature-based options92 seem to promise multiple  co-benefits,  amongst
them the capacity to self-adjust to SLR.103 But research is needed to better understand effectiveness,
optimal  timing  and  benefit-cost  ratios  together  with  other  socially  relevant  criteria  such  as  risk
tolerance and social desirability associated with both traditional and novel adaptation options across
the full ranges of SLR and socio-economic uncertainties.
A second, much less developed research avenue concerns understanding and designing governance
arrangements for overcoming financing barriers and social conflicts. This needs to be a priority, as
these are today clearly the most critical barriers to adaptation. Research should thereby target both
international  arrangements  for  enhancing  the  scale  and  effectiveness  of  adaptation  finance
mechanisms under the UNFCCC and beyond,  as  well  as project-based financial  arrangements  for
leveraging public funds, also through the involvement of private investors and project developers. 16
Due to the potential severe distributional consequences of SLR and adaptation, specific attention needs
to be placed on distributional justice, compensation and transfer payments to poorer and rural areas for
which the economics of adaptation is less favourable.
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